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Electoral and Political Changes: the impact on political bureaucratic 





This paper explores a fundamental issue in public administration: the political bureaucratic 
relationship or political administrative interface. Much of the research and writing hitherto has been 
at central government level; and while important work on local government exists, relatively little 
exists on local government. The paper makes an important contribution to the field by researching 
aspects of the political administrative interface in the context of significant electoral and political 
changes in Scottish local government, which introduced single transferable voting and multi member 
wards. The research found an increase in intensity of senior bureaucrats’ political management roles, 
a greater bureaucratization of political and policy roles, increased scrutiny yet mixed findings about 
democratic processes. The approach and findings open up the research field and the paper concludes 
by suggesting some areas of future research potential. 
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The normative political administrative interface in the UK can be traced to the 
Northcote-Trevelyan recommendations and Carltona doctrine. Over the past decades 
the UK has experienced numerous political and administrative changes from 
managerialist reforms (new public management), agencification, to constitutional and 
electoral reforms including the formation of devolved and differentiated polities. It is 
within this area that the paper is located, exploring the effects of recent political 
change on administrative roles. The paper focuses on the reform of the local 
government electoral system, as introduced in a devolved polity of the UK, Scotland 
and consequent political changes. Specifically, the paper explores the political 
administrative interface through analyzing the effects of electoral reform and political 
change of Scottish local government administration through a series of four 
propositions. 
 
Literature and Location of Paper 
 
There have been various scholarly debates and research on the political administrative 
interface (e.g. Aberbach, Putnam and Rockman, 1981; Aberbach and Rockman, 2006; 
Svara, 1999; Farazmand, 1997; Narduli and Stonecash, 1981). A pervasive argument 
has been the ‘dual roles’ approach, which recognises distinct roles in the political 
administrative process, and has framed the debate around interacting roles and 
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relationships between politicians and bureaucrats with bureaucrats as integral parts of 
the policy process and governance in general (Aberbach and Rockman, 2006; Svara, 
1999; Farazmand, 1997; Narduli and Stonecash, 1981). Other studies have found the 
‘overlapping roles’ model dominant in practice, senior officials overlapping with 
elected officials in policy making. Much of the research shows overlapping roles 
rather than separate roles to be the norm (Svara, 2006; Mouritzen and Svara, 2002). 
 
Much of the research in this area is often focused on the senior civil service (e.g. 
Permanent Secretaries) and their political masters (e.g. Ministers). Seldom are there 
studies which explore the political administrative interface at other levels of 
governance, in particular local government. Although there is much research on 
legislative, constitutional and political change, and similarly research on 
administrative reforms and modernization of local government (Copus, 2006; 2004; 
Leach, 2006; Morrell and Hartley, 2006; Rao, 2005; Leach and Copus, 2004; 
Lowndes and Leach, 2004; McAteer and Orr, 2003; Stoker et al, 2003; Leach and 
Wilson, 2002; Temple, 1996), there are few studies which explore the effects of 
political change on administrative aspects of local government (Leach and Lowndes, 
2007; Liddle, 2007; Fenwick et al, 2006; Leach and Charteris, 2000; Rallings et al, 
1995). Certainly in the UK, it is considered an often neglected area of study (Wilson 
and Game, 2006). The considerable body of work which does exist is US based 
(Svara, 2006; 1999; 1985; Frederickson et al, 2004; Nalbandian, 1999; Golembiewski 
and Gabris, 1994) and emerging work from Scandinavia (Jacobsen, 2006). While 
notable comparative work exists, this is focused on setting out a typology of political 
administrative configurations contingent on different forms of (western) democratic 
governance (Mouritzen and Svara, 2002). 
 
There are two broad (distinct but complementary) bodies of work on the relationship 
between elected members and senior officials in councils. First, that resulting from 
changes in governance structures in English local authorities occasioned by a political 
change. The Local Government Act of 2000 aimed at strengthening leadership and 
decision making through executive style structures of governance (for instance, 
cabinet-executive systems). Research and evaluation of this change has been carried 
out including analyses of differences in status between executive cabinet members 
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and non executive council members (Rao, 2005), policy and scrutiny role of 
councilors (Greasley et al, 2004), satisfaction of elected members with these 
arrangements (e.g. John and Gains, 2005). 
 
Second, there is key research on the political administrative interface more generally. 
In the English and Welsh setting the key piece of work on the political bureaucratic 
relationship by Leach and Lowndes’ (2007), based on nine English and Welsh local 
authorities, found that there are a number of roles performed by administrative 
leadership in local councils (no similar research has been undertaken in Scotland; this 
paper starts to address that gap). Their research showed the Wilsonian dichotomous 
tradition of a split between politicians and officers, i.e. councillors make policy and 
officers implement the policies, to be an over-simplification (ibid). Chief executives 
provide strategic direction by leading corporate strategy in less politicised local 
authorities while in more politicised councils it was common practice for the majority 
party manifesto to form the basis for the council’s strategy (Leach and Lowndes, 
2007). This paper complements those bodies of work by analyzing the impact of 
electoral change (the move to single transferable voting, STV, in 2007 for Scottish 
council elections) on political bureaucratic relationships. 
 
Policy and Political Change in Scottish Local Government 
 
The Local Governance (Scotland) Act 2004 legislated for STV and multi member 
wards for local authority elections in Scotland from 2007. STV and multi member 
wards were not new to Scotland. STV was used to elect education authorities from 
1909 until 1928 when local councils assumed responsibility; Stirling Council has used 
STV to elect its community council; prior to 1975 multi member wards were used to 
elect Scottish local councils, with elections held annually in cities and burghs for one 
third of councillors and every three years in counties and districts (Wheatley, 1975). 
Currently multi member constituencies are used in elections to councils in parts of 





However, the motivation behind the 2004 Act can be traced to the McIntosh 
Commission’s (1999) ‘urgent’ recommendation to study (with a view to early 
legislation) the electoral system for local government. This led to the Scottish 
Executive’s establishment of the Reviewing Local Democracy Working Group 
chaired by Richard Kerley, which recommended the STV electoral system (Kerley, 
2000). Importantly the legislation which enacted this was part of the coalition 
negotiation between Labour and Liberal Democrats, necessary to keep this coalition 
in power following the 2003 Scottish parliamentary elections (Denver and Bochel, 
2007). The impetus to introduce electoral reforms was to enhance democracy at local 
government level (Kerley, 2000). 
 
The STV system adopted in Scotland, like other STV systems, allowed voters to 
indicate an order of preference for candidates on the ballot, ranking as many 
candidates as desired. Candidates are successful when an electoral quota is achieved 
(number of valid votes cast / number of seats to be filled + 1). Therefore if there are 
three seats to be filled, the quota is a quarter of the valid votes cast plus one. If fewer 
than necessary candidates achieve the quota, then there is a transfer of votes: in the 
first instance, surplus votes from a winning candidate are transferred according to the 
second and subsequent preferences of voters; if necessary the bottom placed candidate 
is eliminated and his / her votes are re-distributed. This process continues until the 
required numbers of candidates achieve the quota (Bennie, 2007; Bennie and Clark, 
2008; Gilmour, 2007). 
 
Political Changes: STV and Multi Membership Wards 
 
At the 2007 local elections in Scotland, STV was used to elect over 1200 local 
government councillors on the basis of electoral wards, consisting of three or four 
councillors. This led to a more proportional distribution of seats on councils, 
reflecting more proportionately the distribution of votes cast for each party than the 
previous first past the post system, which disproportionately favoured the Labour 
Party. The result of this electoral reform was a greater proportionality in terms of a 
closeness of match between votes cast for a party and the overall council 
representation of that party. There were two related outcomes. First, due to the 
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creation of multi member wards, instead of the pre 2007 single member representative 
first past the post wards, there are now 353 new wards, one quarter of the previous 
number: 163 with four councillors and 190 with three, most wards having mixed party 
representation. Second, there has been an increase in the number of councils with no 
overall party control. Table 1 illustrates the turnaround of political control in Scottish 
Local Government from 2003 – 2007. 
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
This paper provides a preliminary analysis of the impact of this electoral change on 
aspects of the political administrative/bureaucratic interface in local government in 
particular chief executives of councils. There are four broad areas examined, 
expressed as propositions. 
 
First, as anticipated, there is a contrast with pre 2007 in that there is a far greater 
propensity towards councils having a greater diversity of representation – that defined 
in contrast to the comparative uniformity of single party majority control. This change 
is most marked in central Scotland. The research explores the impact of the STV 
induced change on the general broad political bureaucratic role of chief executives. 
 
Leach and Lowndes (2007)  research in England and Wales indicated that chief 
executives’ roles were to ensure good performance of local authorities, but senior 
officers had to display a level of political awareness by acting as an ‘early warning’ 
system, notifying the political leadership of operational problems (e.g. budget 
overspends) to prevent political embarrassment and liabilities (ibid). The role of 
providing a stable decision making environment was particularly tested when there 
was no overall majority council and informal rules may come into play such as chief 
executives acting as intermediaries between political parties or deflecting adversarial 
politics in council meetings (ibid). Thus, their research showed a more active 
engagement of chief executives in the political environment by mediating political 
interests of elected members especially in no overall majority councils (ibid). Our 
first proposition is that where there is no overall majority in Scottish local government 
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as a result of the electoral and political changes, there would be more active political 
management by chief executives. 
 
Second, it can be argued that the lack of overall control, added to the multi party 
representation in many wards leads to a lessening of policy coherence and slower 
policy/decision making. Studies from Pressman and Wildavsky (1973;1984) to more 
recent work indicate that increasing the layers and linkages (vertical, horizontal and 
organizational) amongst policy actors increases the complexity of the policy process 
(e.g. Hupe and Hill, 2006; Scharpf, 1997). Yet some initial case study work has 
indicated that the introduction of STV in Scottish council elections and the 
consequent loss of overall party control has not led to lack of policy direction or to 
inefficient decision making (Electoral Reform Society, 2010). Thus, our second 
proposition is that no overall majority in councils does not lead to a lack of policy 
coherence and slow policy/decision making. 
 
Third, it can be suggested that there may be greater scrutiny of policy making after 
the introduction of STV, particularly where previously one party has traditionally 
dominated disproportionately, this skewing the activity of council officers towards 
servicing the dominant party at the expense of other parties in the council, or the 
council as a whole. Accompanying this, it could also be argued that the requirement 
to service and advise three or four councillors per ward representing different parties 
will lead to job and role extension. Early case research indicates increased levels of 
scrutiny of political decisions by elected members within councils (Electoral Reform 
Society, 2010), though there has been little directly stated on how this affects senior 
officials. Our third proposition is that the electoral and political changes have resulted 
in an increased level of scrutiny in policy making. 
 
Fourth, is the area of democratic enhancement. The electoral reform was introduced 
on the premise of ‘renewal of local democracy’ (Kerley, 2000), achieved partly via 
increased proportionality in the system. It was always understood that a trade off was 
required between proportionality and the maintenance of a councillor ward link: the 
greater the number of seats per ward the more proportionate the result is likely to be, 
but increased numbers of representatives per ward comes at the expense of the 
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councillor ward link which potentially brings a dilution in the public’s perception of 
the representative – ward accountability relationship. This leads to the possibility of 
unpredictable constituent behaviour. Who does a constituent contact in a ward with 
several representatives? Additionally, how do ward representatives especially in the 
context of multi party ward representation, relate to each other? A balance was struck 
between proportionality and the desire to maintain the councillor ward link in the 
proposed (Kerley, 2000) and actual legislation. This balance could be a tension point 
facing chief executives and other senior officials in their political administrative/ 
bureaucratic roles. Thus, our fourth proposition is that there are tensions for chief 
executives in balancing demands emanating from multi ward representation and 




The research sought to explore the propositions and involved primary and secondary 
data collection and analysis. The secondary data included scholarly literature, 
government reports and policy documents, as well as data sourced from government 
websites. The primary data collection methods involved qualitative self-report 
questionnaires and interviews of senior officers within Scottish local authorities. The 
optional choice of an interview or self-report questionnaire was given to participants 
in order to improve response rates. The survey instrument for the interviews and self-
report questionnaires was standardized. The survey focused on the role and 
responsibilities of the administrative leadership within local government; the impact 
of multi membership wards; the effect of STV. To ensure robustness the survey 
instrument was piloted with seven focus groups of senior to middle managers (n=93) 
from three local authorities. The three local authorities approximated a cross section 
of the post 2007 election environment. These local authorities experienced a changed 
political complexion with two having no overall party in control. One covered a 
mainly rural area and two covered mixed rural–urban areas with significant urban 
population concentrations, yet sizeable rural hinterlands. The focus groups informed 
the design of the survey instrument. All chief executives of Scotland’s thirty-two local 
authorities were approached to participate in the research. The response rate was 
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forty-six percent (n=15). For ethical assurances of anonymity and confidentiality, the 




Proposition One: Political Management 
 
STV has increased the likelihood of no overall majority councils or political parties 
working in coalition to form a governing body/ an administration. These political 
configurations are often fragile with a reliance on cross-party working or dependence 
on independent councillors to reach a consensus in decision making. It has resulted in 
an increased level of coalition and minority administration politics. There was an 
overall consensus in responses that coalition and no overall majority administrations 
have increased the complexity of chief executives’ roles. Chief executives stated their 
level of political awareness and engagement with all political parties has increased. In 
previous administrations there would have been a stronger presence of engagement 
and work with one political party which formed the majority administration. Prior to 
2007 in over 40% of councils, the Labour Party had the overall majority (with the 
figure higher in central belt councils). Throughout Scotland two thirds of all councils 
were single party controlled – Labour 13 councils, Independent 6 councils, Lib Dem 
or SNP with 1 council each. Since 2007 minority or coalition administrations are the 
norm (27 of the 32 councils – see Table 1).  
 
The research found an increase in chief executives’ level of political engagement and 
required acumen. For example two chief executives saw a change in administration 
within one year when the coalition administration dissolved and thereby necessitated 
working with new administrations. The following quote illustrates the increased 
complexity of the chief executives’ roles within no overall majority councils: 
 
‘In the past the majority of chief executives, we are responsible for delivering 
the policies and priorities of the council, and in the past this would happen 
through a political party which would have the majority of seats so you had a 
single relationship with the administration at the time and that meant that you 
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could have that dialogue. You could sit down in a room, you could actually 
debate the ins and outs of things, of different things and could decide what is 
going to be recommended and it then goes in front of the Council but you know 
in taking something forward you know it has been debated and you know you 
have got the agreement of the administration of the political party in power. 
That no longer is guaranteed by any means. So the role of a chief executive is 
now that you are not dealing with one political party, but now when you have 
new policies coming through you now have to square the circle and deal with all 
the political parties because decisions could go in any direction.’ (CE C) 
 
‘In terms of leadership post-election, there is now a different dynamic to 
member – officer relationships…The need to manage more complex political 
relationships has a day-to-day impact on the chief executive’s leadership role 
with regard to the fact that all of the wards within this authority are ‘split 
wards’, and the relationship between the representatives of each of the wards, as 
well as between the parties and also between members and officers has to be 
dealt with sensitively, firmly and in an egalitarian manner’ (CE D).  
 
Proposition Two: Policy Coherence  
 
A related point to increased political management by chief executives is, as the above 
quotes reveal, a level of unpredictability in decision making and voting outcomes of 
councils. There was a consistent finding of a lack of coherence from the political 
leadership. Chief executives stated that their political management role has increased 
in an attempt to reach a consensus across the political leadership and the council. 
Chief executives stated that no overall majority and coalition politics have resulted in 
less policy direction from the political leadership. The lack of consistent policy 
direction and often constant changes to policies from the political leadership has 
increased their job demands and respondents believed that the lack of direction has 
impacted negatively on improving service delivery at a local level. Yet, chief 
executives believed that a positive outcome of no overall majority and coalition 
administrations was the opportunity to build consensus and increase the 
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representation of the diverse interests in policy. But chief executives also felt that this 
led to ‘satisficing’ rather than optimal decisions being made. According to one chief 
executive there is less opportunity for positive and dynamic change, but rather more 
time spent on consensus building and satisfying all political interests, often resulting 
in slow, incremental change. A frustration expressed by many chief executives was 
the slow pace of decision making – a result of consensus politicking. Chief executives 
stated that the most demanding aspect to their increased political management role is 
attempting to achieve a consensus among political parties in order to ensure 
coherence and a clear policy direction from political leadership. Some chief 
executives defined their political management role as ‘honest brokers’ in a political 
game often requiring good negotiation and conflict resolution skills. The following 
quotes illustrate this point:  
 
‘It has certainly made our leadership much more sharp and clearly defined 
because we are constantly trying to move between the administration and the 
other people surrounding the administration whether it is the main opposition or 
the independents or the other minor parties because they have to come forward 
with ways in which to work together and the chief executive then takes on a 
much stronger role in having to sort of manage that process. So it is a situation 
where a chief executive has to get to be more fleet-afoot and produce even a 
more stronger leadership for the Council because they have to work across so 
many different groupings and arrangements’ (CE E). 
 
‘So you are actually in a position at the moment where political coherence is a 
lot less apparent than it used to be. In another forum I would argue that is not a 
bad thing but actually when you are trying to deliver services on the back of it 
creates time delays and confusion. I have no difficulty with them doing the 
politics except when it gets in the way of making progress. To be honest I don’t 
think any of these issues were properly thought through by people who 
legislated …. I hate to compare the role of a chief executive to a stressed-out 
parent but it just seems like it…the role of a chief executive is the management 
and priorities and part of that is political management and yes part of that is also 




In terms of politicking within the councils chief executives noted the influential role 
played by independent councillors in the ability to shift the balance of power within 
the council. The chief executives noted that this provides independent councillors 
with considerable leverage, which they draw upon as a source of ‘horse-trading’, 
often skewing decision making.  
 
Proposition Three: Scrutiny of Policy Making 
 
Chief executives noted that there is more interrogation and briefing required with 
regard   to the political leadership within the council. Thus, the chief executives’ level 
and intensity of policy advice has increased, often requiring chief executives to be 
much more prepared for questions and discussion around policy. Many respondents 
viewed this as having positive and negative outcomes. For example, there has been an 
increase in job demands, but there has also been an improved level of accountability 
and scrutiny of policy advice. Many of the chief executives with regards to the latter 
point argued that it has improved policy making. However, a frequently cited negative 
outcome of both STV and multi member wards was the increase in job demands, 
which as the quotation below indicates can work to the detriment of substantive 
policy advice and robust policy making. The research found that multi member wards 
have increased job demands for chief executives and senior officers. Senior officers 
have to be responsive to three or four councillors for each ward as opposed to one. 
For example, a chief executive stated that: 
 
‘One of my Directors was saying the other day that he set up a separate email 
account for all emails coming in from councillors… in the past he and his 
secretary could actually work that through, but now he has got two 
administrators working full-time on it and if that is one service area replicate, 
that among the four services and I would suspect we have actually had to 
increase the number of staff to cope with this by half a dozen…but my take is 
that a lot of senior managers in local government are stressed by the additional 
work they are being asked to do at the moment. More council meetings, more 
meetings in the evening, non-stop requests for information and certainly the 
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debate we have had in my management team is that we are no longer having the 
time to do the policy, strategy stuff and taking things forward because we are 
actually caught up in what one of my Directors recently called the “grunge” of 
multi member wards. It is actually reducing the capacity for local government to 
be innovative and go forward. So yeah I do think there has been a lot of damage 
done by multi member wards in that respect. I mean I have got senior officers in 
my council at the moment not approaching retirement age saying “I am getting 
out of this I am not doing this, I can’t tolerate this any longer.”’ (CE C). 
 
Proposition Four: Democratic Enhancement and the Role of Chief Executives  
 
The democratic enhancement which STV and multi member wards in local councils 
was designed around, represents a trade-off between proportionality on the one hand 
and the desire to have a councillor ward accountability link on the other. How this 
impacts on chief executives in their political administrative interface can be viewed in 
three ways. 
 
First, the research found that rivalry and political trading among ward councillors 
often increases the level of chief executive and senior officers’ political management 
role. As a chief executive noted: 
 
‘We get a lot more pressure from elected members. A lot more complaints. Yes, 
it’s because there are members of different political groups representing a ward. 
They are all in competition with each other in the ward. We have a very 
political Council. The bulk of councillors are either Labour or SNP and they are 
very adversarial to each other. Before that was in the Council but now it spills 
over to multi member wards. It’s mostly personalities’ (CE B). 
 
Second, a further outcome of multi member wards is ‘game-playing’ by constituents. 
Some constituents who are aware they have a ‘choice’ among three to four councillors 
within a ward, often of different political persuasions, pit councillors against each 
other or intensify rivalry to maximise the outcome in their favour. Similarly, 
constituents who are not satisfied with an outcome of an administrative decision seek 
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intervention from the various ward councillors until they receive a satisfactory 
outcome. The conjunction of this ‘game playing’ by constituents and rivalrous 
politicking among councillors often increases the workload and job demands for 
officers as the following quote illustrates: 
 
‘Challenges vary from where one member has been approached on an issue by 
a constituent and raised that issue with officers and been given a response and 
the response isn’t to the satisfaction of the constituent, and will go to another 
member and that member makes further representation on the same matter. 
Now with a large organisation the potential for the second referral perhaps not 
to be dealt with by the same individual and it would be very difficult if another 
response was given. So ensuring that there is consistency in communication 
throughout the system is very, very important.  I hope that explains just some 
of the challenges that the multi member ward system represents’ (CE G). 
Third, respondents noted that a negative outcome of the multi member ward is a 
democratic deficit. Whilst some constituents understood the new multi member ward 
system (as noted above), many constituents are neither aware nor understand the 
system. Some respondents noted that the administration of the council often receive 
correspondence from constituents with regards to the political representative for their 
ward having been accustomed to the first past the post system. Respondents are of the 
opinion that more voter education about the multi member wards and STV is required 
to address what they referred to as a democratic deficit. 
 
Thus, the responses to questions of whether STV and multi member wards enhance 
democracy were mixed. There was a clearly articulated view that the balance between 
the proportionality of multi member wards and accountability was rather uneasy, 
causing tension for chief executives in their political management role. Some chief 
executives went as far as to state that STV did not enhance democracy as it created 
more scope for conflict requiring mediation or brokering by the administrative 
leadership to ameliorate political tensions. They also believed that STV created a 
democratic deficit since the dominance of politicking and rivalrous behaviour 
distracted or deflected real scrutiny and accountability of policy decisions and/or 
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often slowed the pace of decision making for service delivery improvements. On the 
other hand, chief executives believed that STV and multi member wards enhanced 
democracy as there was more diverse political representation as opposed to one party 
dominating the political leadership of the council. These chief executives believed 
that there was a proportionate representation of the local community’s interests and 
with more political representation there was scope for the scrutiny of policy and 
decision making. Another facet which some chief executives expressed was a degree 
of uncertainty as to whether STV and multi member wards enhanced democracy as 
they recognised the diversity of political representation, yet acknowledged the lack of 
stable government undermined policy making and service delivery. In addition there 
was an acknowledgement of the level of voter unawareness of the system, a lack of 
clarity about which councillor represented constituent interests and which elected 
representative to hold accountable for matters occurring in the ward. 
 
In terms of the first research proposition there is evidence that where there is no 
overall majority councils (the majority of cases in Scotland), chief executives play a 
more active political management role in their respective local councils. This finding 
is consistent with the English and Welsh local government study (see Leach and 
Lowndes, 2007). Second, the research suggests that indeed where there is no overall 
majority council, there is a lack of policy coherence and slow policy/ decision 
making. This finding is inconsistent with the Electoral Reform Society (2010) 
research. The third proposition: the electoral and political changes in Scottish local 
government has led to an increase in scrutiny in the policy making process and 
consequent increase in job demands of chief executives. Finally, although there is no 
conclusive evidence whether the electoral and political changes have indeed enhanced 
democracy, there are tensions for chief executives and senior officers in balancing the 
demands of responsiveness and accountability with consequent increased job 
demands. 
 
Conclusion and Future Research Directions 
 
The research indicated there is clearly more active engagement in political 
management by chief executives in the post 2007 environment. Nonetheless, the 
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relationship between chief executives’ administrative sphere and the political sphere 
indicated the existence of boundaries: there was no sense in which one dominated the 
other or that there was competition between spheres in the political process (Svara, 
2006). In other words this research found the existence of overlapping – consistent 
with other scholarly writing in this area. 
 
Other related evidence lends support to the findings of Leach and Lowndes’ (2007). 
Scottish chief executives view their role as providing advice for the council to set 
policy direction; providing a stable decision and policy making environment through 
their political management role. According to Leach and Lowndes (ibid) in no overall 
majority councils the stable decision making environment was tested, providing chief 
executives with more scope in developing policy. Similarly our research found that 
chief executives within no overall majority councils, given the relative absence of 
strong political leadership or direction, have more scope to provide advice for policy 
direction for the council. The increased level of chief executives’ political 
management arguably is a shift from the traditional role of being merely head of paid 
service and towards a bureaucratisation of political and policy roles. Some chief 
executives noted advantages in this changed environment: the lack of no overall 
majority led to the requirement for consensus building and greater degrees of political 
inclusion in decision making. 
 
Some chief executives noted that STV and the resultant no overall majority councils 
have brought some disadvantage resulting in a decline in policy direction with 
adverse implications for the effective delivery of service.  For example, consensus 
building often led to the slow pace of decision making and the ‘satisficing’ of 
decisions with less scope for innovative change and service delivery. Such a decline 
in policy coherence and direction may be accounted for, if projected Scotland wide, 
by two other aspects of the change in the electoral system. First, there was a 
substantial ‘churn’ of councillors in the newly elected local councils in 2007 due to  
the more proportional distribution of seats plus the fewer than usual incumbents 
choosing to defend their seats: in 2003 76% of those who won council seats were 
already incumbents, but in 2007 the figure was only 51% (Denver and Bochel, 2007). 
Second, in 7 councils overall, the administration excluded the largest party from 
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office (Bennie and Clark, 2008). Arguably both these factors may reflect, in the first 
instance, a relative lack of experience in council policy making capacity amongst 
councillors and, in the second, exclusion of policy capacity from the largest party 
group elected to the council. This may explain the inconsistency of findings between 
this study and the Electoral Reform Society (2010) research. Thus, further research 
concerning political change and the impact on policy coherence is required. 
 
It appears that the changed political landscape has increased the level of chief 
executives’ role in the political administrative interface; in terms of increased job and 
role demands the evidence was uniform. There are also examples of increased 
responsiveness and accountability upwards to political leadership through more 
scrutiny of policy advice. This was consistent with other research undertaken in a 
number of councils where it was shown that senior officers took a much more pro-
active role in providing advice and support to all major political parties, including 
those in opposition, to an extent ‘unthinkable’ pre 2007 – with clear outcomes on the 
quality of policy scrutiny (Electoral Reform Society 2010). Chief executives suffer 
from role stretch with the enlarging political management role and the responsibilities 
of ensuring consensus and mediating various political interests, responding to 
councillor/ constituency demands, increased policy advice and scrutiny. This has 
consequently increased the chief executive’s role as key in the political environment 
nexus. Thus, there was considerable tension and chief executive role stretch caused by 
the changes to the democratic configuration of council representation. The research 
showed that no overall majority in conjunction with multi member wards created 
considerable role stretch, the resultant political rivalry among councillors requiring 
brokering by chief executives in order to build consensus and enable a stable decision 
making environment to achieve consistent direction from the political leadership.  
 
Voter awareness of STV and multi member wards represents a significant democratic 
deficiency as well as increased demands on the chief executive role, although the 
level of constituency ‘game-playing’ may indeed add value to democratic ideals by 
increasing the level of chief executives’ responsiveness and accountability 




Finally there are areas which could form a research agenda to build on the work 
undertaken for this paper. First, there is need for a longitudinal study on the effects of 
future elections on administrative leadership to provide a more comprehensive study. 
The campaigning period prior and during the elections will see an increase in political 
rivalries. As one respondent noted: 
 
‘…what happens in the next election? How do they compete against each 
other? Because previously all opposition parties campaigned against Labour 
but now that they are in power how will they work in a campaign 
environment? They will have to compete against each other. How will this 
affect council working e.g. committee working? In the lead up to the election 
which will probably be from January 2012 they will have to start campaigning 
and that is when rivalries will start’. 
 
The political rivalry during the election period will affect multi member ward 
working, strategic direction from political leadership, a stable decision and policy 
making environment. This will increase the chief executive’s political management 
role – the likelihood is the increased bureaucratisation of political and policy roles, 
with chief executives addressing the void in policy direction due to politicians being 
pre-occupied with electioneering. On a wider canvas, the true extent of the 
bureaucratisation of political and policy roles within local government and tensions 
within the political administrative interface throughout the UK deserves further 
investigation. Whether the medium-longer term outcome of local government 
modernisation and change initiatives is an evolution of political administrative 
relations towards ‘strong leadership’, or whether it entrenches tensions and increases 
the scope for bureaucratisation of political and policy roles, requires a longitudinal 
study across UK local government.  
 
Second, the research can be deepened beyond the impact of electoral process. There is 
evidence to suggest that the political changes thus far at Scottish local government 
level have enabled chief executives to have more scope of influence in the political 
realm and policy process, principally to ensure a policy/ decision making and service 
delivery environment. Research is required on a range of contingent factors which 
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may influence the precise nature of political management arrangements. For instance, 
the form of internal governance used (cabinet, traditional committee, executive and 
corporate management, etc). Also, notwithstanding ‘overlapping’ and ‘dual roles’  
approaches, politicians and bureaucrats do inhabit different spheres and roles in the 
political administrative system (Egberg, 1995) and bureaucrats will likely take a more 
detached view when reconciling political demands, balancing different political 
wishes and interests with financial realities: the constrained financial climate in the 
forthcoming period may well be an important contingent factor when analyzing 
political bureaucratic relationships.  
 
A final research area, following naturally from the focus of this paper, is to increase 
the scope of the political bureaucratic interface research field: to include other local 
council officers below the most senior (e.g. those working at neighbourhood or area 
management level); and to analyse and scrutinize relationships with quasi 
representative organizations (like community groups, citizens’ fora, etc). Indeed the 
research has accentuated relevance given the ‘political’ role played by UK senior civil 
servants in brokering the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government in 
May 2010 (Blitz, 2010), as well as the possible outcomes of political administrative 
relations given the forthcoming debate on electoral reform at Westminster. 
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Table 1: Political Control of Councils 2003 - 2007 Scottish Local Authority Elections  




Single party or group control: Labour 13 2 
Single party or group control: Independent 6 3 
Single party or group control: Lib Dem 1 0 
Single party or group control: SNP 1 0 
Total single party or group control 21 5 
No one party or group control 11 27 
Total number of councils 32 32 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
